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INTRODUCTION

The eurocurrency market is a market for intermediated funds where
eurobanks acting as intermediaries, place themselves between the
depositors of funds and the ultimate users of those funds. Like most
financial markets, the eurocurrency market has a credit and a deposit side.
There are two aspects to the deposit side of the eurocurrency market,
which is the subject matter of this article: ( 1) the market dealing primarily
with the deposit of short-term funds by depositors and the lending of those
funds to the final users or borrowers, and (2) the market dealing with the
interbank placement of funds where commercial banks borrow, lend, or
trade eurocurrency among themselves. The operation of the eurocurrency
market gives rise to legal relationships between eurobanks, their customers
and other intermediary banks that may be different from the traditional
banker-customer relationship. This article discusses the nature and
operation of the eurocurrency market and how the legal consequences of
the eurobank customer relationship are different from the domestic
banker-customer relationship. It argues that there is a need for a
redefinition of the common law on the banker-customer relationship.
I.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EUROCURRENCY DEPOSIT OPERATION

Eurocurrency deposit operations involve the placing and taking of
deposits. The transactions are essentially loan transactions. The owners of
the funds place the funds in banks or lend these funds while the depository
banks take or accept the funds thus placed with them. A typical
eurocurrency deposit 1 operation will therefore usually involve four groups
*Barrister, Solicitor & Lecturer in International Financial Law & Regulation, Faculty of
Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
1. Although one reference is usually made to the eurocurrency deposit, from the legal
point of view, there are two aspects of the transaction. The transaction is broken down into
(1) the traditional deposit arrangement and (2) a separate loan transaction. The separate
loan transaction is between the depositor as the lender of the funds and the bank as the
borrower. The loan agreement will specify certain terms including (1) the currency; (2) the
place of payment; (3) the duration of the deposit; (4) the rates of interest; and (5) the
currency and place of repayment. See D. Urech, Elements of Contractual Law in
Euromoney Dealings, 1 J. INT'L BANKING LAW 14 (1998), available at 2004 WL UK-JLR
4644056; D. CARREAU, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
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of participants: the original depositors, who in relation to the bank, are also
lenders of the funds; the depository banks; other intermediary banks in the
interbank market; and the final users of the funds. 2

A.

The Depositors

It is possible to group the initial depositors of eurocurrency funds into
three categories: official institutions such as government and quasigovernment bodies, central banks and other depositors of funds, which are
neither government nor financial institutions. This latter group includes
international corporations and individuals. 3 These initial depositors of
funds enter the market in a number of ways and for a variety of reasons.
Official institutions such as governments, government bodies and central
banks may enter the market directly as suppliers of funds when they
deposit a portion of their national reserves of a particular currency in
eurobanks. The rationale for entering the market in this manner could
include the desire to earn higher yields than would be possible in their own
commercial banks.
Central banks may also supply funds indirectly through the use of
swap arrangements. In this case, the central banks will sell foreign
currency to their national commercial banks with the understanding that
the concerned commercial banks will use those funds to procure foreign
currency assets, reduce their liabilities and finance international trade. The
central banks will then repurchase the currency at a later date. In most
cases where such swap arrangements are used, the rationale is to further
national monetary policy by controlling domestic monetary conditions and
short-term capital flows.
Commercial banks constitute the institutional core of the
eurocurrency market. Although primarily concerned with their role as
intermediaries, commercial banks, nevertheless, contribute to the supply of
eurocurrency. They may purchase foreign currency and then place these
funds in the market, or they may use such funds to finance the

DEPOSIT CONTRACTS 147 (Hans Smit, et al. eds., Matthew Bender 1981); and PAUL EINZIG,
THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM 11 (St. Martin's Press, 5th ed. 1973).
2. The Eurocurrency deposit operation involves only three groups of participants. See e.g.,
E. WAYNE CLENDENNING, THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET 16 (Clarendon Press, 1970). These
commentators prefer to group both the depository banks and the other intermediary banks in the
interbank market into the same category. Id. While this approach may be appropriate as a form
of classification, it would seem more appropriate, for the purpose achieving clarity in the
subsequent analysis of the mechanics of Eurocurrency deposit and interbank placement
operations, to adopt the approach used in this work.
3. CLENDENNING, supra note 2, at 44; MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 46-47 (Dow
Jones-Irwin 3d ed. 1990).
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international trade of their customers. When acting as financial
intermediaries, commercial banks contribute also to the supply of
eurocurrency by engaging in deposit expansion, that is the process of
placing funds deposited with them in the interbank market.
Institutions such as private corporations, as well as individuals
engaged in international business, may also supply eurocurrency when
they deposit their receipts in banks outside the country of issue of the
currency involved. Such individuals and corporations may possess
extensive reserves of foreign currency outside their own countries as
proceeds from international trade. They may prefer to hold such deposits
in foreign currency for a variety of reasons. First, they would prefer to
hold the currency in banks outside the country of issue and their own
countries because of the higher rates offered. Other reasons could also
include the relative convenience of holding that particular currency as
against others and the cost involved in exchanging the currency for local
currency.

B.

The Depository Banks

The other participants in the offshore currency deposit and placement
operation, are the commercial banks, acting as depository institutions and,
in most cases, also playing an important role as financial intermediaries.
When the intermediary (depository) bank takes or accepts funds it may do
any of three things: (1) it may lend the deposit directly to borrowers,
assuming that borrowers who have immediate needs for a loan in that
currency exist; (2) it may seek an outlet for the funds by placing them in
the interbank market; and (3) it may use the funds to meet its own liquidity
requirements.
C.

The Intermediary Banks

The other participants in the offshore currency deposit and placement
process are the intermediary banks in the interbank market. Although it is
possible to regard such banks as belonging in the same category as the
initial depository institutions, the functions that the interbank market
performs in the eurocurrency market, requires their separate consideration.
The eurocurrency market is primarily an interbank market where the initial
deposit or placement of funds is passed from bank to bank under the
process of deposit expansion. At one end of the chain of transactions is the
initial depository bank and at the other end may be the final users of the
funds. Inbetween these two participants may be a chain of other
intermediary commercial banks who take the deposits and loan the funds
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at narrow margins to other banks. 4 Interbank eurocurrency trading is
conducted both between eurocurrency centers and within eurocurrency
centers. 5 Both forms of interbank trading fulfil specific functions.
Trading within a eurocurrency center promotes liquidity smoothing,
liquidity transfer and currency transfer. 6 Liquidity smoothing involves the
process where banks seek to manage the structure of their assets and
liabilities and reduce transaction costs. This is usually achieved by the
transmutation of assets during the process of financial intermediation. The
transmutation of assets takes place when the eurobanks, by placing funds
in the interbank market, are able not only to invest in claims of the final
users and tailor such claims to meet the user's needs, but also are able to
change the form of these claims. They then issue liabilities on themselves,
tailored to meet the maturity and liquidity needs of the initial depositors or
investors. Liquidity transfer is the transfer of liquidity from one bank to
another, reflecting the reality that not all banks are able to attract funds
from primary sources. Finally, currency transfer involves the process
where the eurobanks are enabled to match the currency composition of
their assets through the use of the interbank market, and thus avoid foreign
exchange exposure.
Interbank trading between centers, on the other hand, promotes
global liquidity distribution. Global liquidity distribution, in simple terms,
is the process of using the interbank market to normalize the demand and
supply of funds in individual local markets and to reduce transaction costs
that would otherwise prevail in transactions between banks of different
jurisdictions. The main function of the interbank market is, thus, to reduce
the risk inherent in the operation of the eurocurrency market, by spreading
such risk among a number of commercial banks according to the degree of
risk that the particular bank is prepared to accept.

D.

The Borrowers: Final Users of Eurocurrency Deposits

The final users of funds placed in the eurocurrency market include
official institutions, commercial banks, other financial institutions, and
individuals. Since most of these users of the funds may employ the funds
borrowed in any number of ways, it is difficult to determine in precise
terms the exact range of final users. Although official institutions play an
important role as suppliers of eurocurrency, they are relatively small users
of such funds as compared to other users. In most cases, official users

4. The mechanics of the interbank placement transaction are considered later in the article.
5. EUGENE SARVER, THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET HANDBOOK 204 (Prentice Hall 1988).
6. ANDREASHAINDL, THE EURO MONEY MARKET 47 (Paul Haupt 1991).
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such as governments and quasi-government instrumentalities, take funds
in the form of loans and, depending on the amount involved, the loan may
take the form of syndicated eurocurrency credits.
The predominant users of the funds deposited in the offshore
currency market are commercial banks. As has been observed above,
commercial banks make a great deal of use of the interbank market in the
process of intermediation. Although commercial banks may channel
funds to other users, the offshore currency market also serves the liquidity
needs of the commercial banks.
Other private sector users of eurocurrency are international firms and
individuals. In all these cases, the users of eurocurrency may incur
different kinds of liability to the financial intermediaries. For example,
while a sovereign borrower may take the funds in the form of a syndicated
loan, corporations may prefer to issue notes or commercial paper in
exchange for the funds.
II.

THE MECHANICS OF THE EUROCURRENCY DEPOSIT

In the process of moving funds from the initial depositors of the
funds to the ultimate users, intermediary banks rely on the services of
correspondent banks as well as on those of electronic funds transfer
mechanisms. It is thus appropriate to discuss the role of correspondent
banks in attempting the electronic funds transfer process before an
examination of the mechanics of the placement process.

A.

The Role of Correspondent Banks

It is important to distinguish correspondent banking from the
financial intermediation of commercial banks engaged in eurocurrency
placements, both of which take place in the interbank market. Financial
intermediation is the process where financial intermediaries, in most cases
banks, but which could also include brokerage houses, place themselves
between the suppliers of the funds and the users of those funds. More
often than not, financial intermediation in the interbank market takes place
as an integral part of the interbank offshore currency placement process.
Correspondent banking may also take place in the interbank market,
as part of the offshore currency deposit and placement process. This is
usually the situation where an initial deposit is placed in the interbank
market by a depository bank, as opposed to being loaned directly to a
borrower. However, this is the only similarity between the two concepts.
Correspondent banking refers to the system of "reciprocal bank accounts
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between participating institutions"7 created to facilitate receipts and
payment in foreign currency. 8 Although correspondent banking also
occurs in the domestic context, this section of this article is concerned with
correspondent banking in the operation of eurocurrency deposits. In
international banking, in general, it is usual for domestic banks with
substantial international affairs to open accounts in their names with banks
overseas, through and into which payments of foreign currency may be
made or received. These correspondent accounts are referred to as nostro
and vostro accounts, primarily in Europe, 9 or due from and due to accounts
respectively in North America. 10 Nostro account means our account
maintained at another institution, while vostro account means your
account with us.
Thus if X Bank, located in the U.S., has deposits of dollars with Y
Bank in the United Kingdom, the nostro or due from account of X Bank
will reflect the amount of dollars on deposit with its United Kingdom
correspondent Y Bank. 11 Likewise, from the perspective of Y Bank, the
vostro or due to account ofX Bank, will reflect the amount of U.S. dollars
that the correspondent of Y Bank, X Bank, maintains with it. 12 The
process of correspondent banking is facilitated by the use of automated or
electronic fund transfer systems, by means of which the accounts of the
respective banks are debited or credited.

B.

The Role of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems

The eurocurrency market works essentially through a network of
telecommunication lines that link various eurocurrency centers and banks.
Although there are other methods of funds transfer, such as the use of
airmail, bank checks and drafts, a large percentage of international
interbank eurocurrency transfers are effected electronically.1 3 This is so
for several reasons. First, the eurocurrency market being a wholesale
market deals in large quantities in funds, with relatively short-term
maturities. It is thus expedient to use a mode of fund transfer that

7. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 157.
8. DONALD I. BAKER AND RONALD E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFERS 29-2(Warren et al. eds., 1988).
9. STIGUM, supra note 3, at 202.
10. Id.
11. See generally BAKER AND BRANDEL, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Banking Technology: The Interbank Networks, EUROMONEY 128 (1987); see also
BENJAMIN GEYA, THE LAw OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS ( 1992) [hereinafter GEYA LAw OF
EFT].
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combines speed with security. 14
Secondly, because eurocurrency
transactions usually involve parties separated from each other by long
distances, it is necessary to use electronic transfer systems to bring them
closer together.
Furthermore, because eurocurrency are funds
denominated in currency held on the books of banks outside the country of
issue, except those eurodollars held in international banking facilities in
the United States, the financial institutions concerned do not have access
to those currencies with which they deal. 15 This creates the need for
correspondent banks, which may have direct access to those funds, and the
need to link such institutions to facilitate transactions. The role of
electronic funds transfer systems is, thus, to link financial institutions
separated by time and space, to facilitate international financial
transactions. The majority of international funds transfers are processed
by two main organizations, depending on whether the funds transfer
involves the U.S. dollar or some other currency. These two organizations
are the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
(SWIFT) 16 and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS). 17 While SWIFT is an international communications network for
all currencies, CHIPS is a department of the New York Clearing House
Association and is therefore, the private clearing system for only U.S.
dollars. 18
SWIFT is not a funds transfer system, but facilitates the transfer of

14. Benjamin Geva, International Funds Transfers: Performances by Wire Payment, 4
BANKING AND FINANCE L. REV., at 113-14. (1990)
15. Urech, supra note 1, at 16; CARREAU, supra note 1, at 148.
16. SWIFT, a non-profit cooperative company organized under Belgian law, was
founded in 1973 by 239 European, American and Canadian banks and is currently owned by
about 1,650 member banks. Each year the members of SWIFT elect a board of directors,
which in tum chooses a general manager, vested with the authority to make decisions
concerning the use of the facilities of SWIFT. Membership of SWIFT is open to
organizations engaged in the business of banking and in the transmission of financial
messages. Currently, the facilities of SWIFT are used by over 2,600 financial institutions in
over 65 countries. For other discussion of SWIFT and related aspects of its operations, see
generally Ezra U. Byler and James C. Baker, SWIFT: A Fast Method to Facilitate
International Financial Transactions 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 485 (1983); Jeffery S.
Tallackson & Norma Vallejo, International Commercial Wire Transfers: The Lack of
Standards 11 N . C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639 (1986); John S. Santa Lucia, Losses from
International Electronic Funds Transfers: Time to Unify the Law (1988) 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 759 (1988); Herbert F. Lingl, Risk Allocation in International Interbank Electronic
Funds Transfers: Chips and SWIFT 22 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 621 (1981); GEVA LAW OF EFT,
supra note 13, § 4-35.
17. See also Deborah S. Prutzman, Chips and the Proposed Uniform New Payments Code
10 RUTGERS COMPUTER& TECH. L.J 1 (1983); GEVALAWOFEFT, supra note 13, at ch. 3.
18. Benjamin Geva, CHIPS Transfer ofFunds 4 J. INT'L BANKING L. 208 (1987); see also
GEVALAWOFEFT, supra note 13, § 3-23.
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funds through the provision of a reliable and fast telecommunications
network for transmitting messages concerning funds. 19 Since the primary
purpose of SWIFT is to transmit messages for its members, the members
of SWIFT use its network not only to transmit messages concerning funds
transfer in a variety of currencies but also for other operations including
debit and credit advices, statements, foreign exchange operations and
money market confirmations, collections, documentary credits, interbank
securities trading and balance reporting. In the context of the transmission
of payment messages, the actual settlement of payment between the banks
is effected by debits and credits to accounts of those banks or to
correspondent bank accounts. 20
CHIPS is a department of the New York Clearing House Association
and is the international private clearing system for large dollar transfers.
This means that all wholesale international transactions involving the use
of the dollar go through CHIPS. 21 CHIPS, is thus, a settlement as well as
a communications network. 22 Since the CHIPS network is the clearing
system for euro-dollar transactions, its role is limited to transmitting
payment messages concerning dollar transactions between payor-sendingbank participants and payee-receiving-bank participants in the New York
interbank payments system. Almost invariably therefore, a transaction or
payments message that originates outside the New York Interbank
Payments System and involves the use of dollars, originates as a SWIFT
message, and is eventually settled in New York via CHIPS.

C.

The Eurocurrency Deposit Operation

With the above discussion about correspondent banking and the
electronic funds transfer system that facilitates eurocurrency depositing as
a background, it is now possible to examine the nature of a typical
eurocurrency deposit and placement transaction and to examine the legal
relationships that arise in such a transaction. A typical situation of the
deposit and transfer of funds denominated in U.S. dollars in the
eurocurrency market could take place in the following manner. Assume

19. Geva, supra note 14, at 116; GEVA LAW OF EFT, supra note 13, § 4-35.
20. Geva, supra note 14, at 112.
21. SARVER, supra note 5, at 207; LINGL, supra note 16, at 626; GEVA LAW OF EFT, supra
note 13, § 3-23. Theoretically, transfers of dollars could also pass through another U.S. wire
transfer system-FEDWIRE. It is the Federal Reserve System's national electronic
communications network. While CHIPS makes available same day funds, FEDWIRE provides
immediately available Federal Reserve funds. Although no restrictions are imposed by either
CHIPS or FEDWIRE on the kinds of payment transmitted via either system, in practice
FEDWIRE attracts securities transactions while CHIPS attracts foreign exchange transactions.
22. GEVALAWOFEFT, supra note 13, § 3-23, ~3.03.
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the following facts: a fictitious Kingdom of Peruvia has a central bank
called Peruvia National Bank. Peruvia National Bank maintains an
account with a U.S.-based Bank (Citizens Bank), into which it receives
payment in US dollars. The current balance of Peruvia National Bank's
account with Citizens Bank now stands at $10 million. Assume that the
government and directors of the Peruvia National Bank decide that instead
ofletting the funds sit idle in the U.S. bank they could be transferred into a
euro-dollar account in the United Kingdom at an advantageous rate of
interest and Peruvia concludes a deal with the relevant U.K. bank (Abbey
Bank). As discussed previously, the method of operating offshore
currency deposits in general and eurocurrency deposits, creates a
distinction between (1) the deposit of funds by depositors who are the
lenders of the funds and (2) the interbank placement or bank-to-bank
trading of deposited funds. This distinction influences the nature of the
current practice in the operation of eurocurrency deposits. According to
the current practice, when the eurocurrency depositor is a sophisticated
customer, as opposed to a bank seeking to make an interbank placement, it
is usual for the eurocurrency deposit to be formally documented pursuant
to negotiations between such a customer and the depository eurobank.
Depending on the negotiations between the eurobank and the customer,
the documentation of the eurocurrency deposit may relate to any of the
following: ( 1) time or fixed term deposit evidenced by a written contract;
(2) a time or fixed term deposit evidenced by a certificate of deposit; 23 and
(3) a call deposit or call money. 24 In the scenario used in this section the

23. For the purposes of withdrawal, bank deposits may be classified into (1) demand
deposits and (2) time or fixed term deposits. While demand deposits may be withdrawn or
transferred by a depositor without notice, time deposits may only be withdrawn at a specified
future date or maturity date. Savings deposits are a kind of time deposit because, in general, the
bank reserves the right to require notice before withdrawal. However, unlike time deposits
evidenced by certificates of deposit and those evidenced by written contracts, which are interest
bearing deposits with specific maturities, savings deposits do not have fixed maturities. Time or
fixed term deposits have not always been evidenced by negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs),
and currently may not always be so evidenced. Time deposits began to be evidenced by CDs
when banks located in London, compelled by the desire to satisfy the demands of their
customers for liquidity, began to issue dollar denominated CDs. Currently, CDs issued in the
London money market are denominated in a variety of currencies, including Yen, Can$, Aus$,
SDR, ECU, NZ$, Lire, N.Kr., and D.Kr. See generally, LONDON CODE OF CONDUCT: FOR
PRINCIPALS AND BROKING FIRMS IN THE WHOLESALE MARKETS 20 (1992) [hereinafter LONDON
CODE OF CONDUCT]. There is no universally accepted format for time or fixed term deposits
evidenced by written contract and each bank adopts its own unique contractual format and
documentation.
24. See STIGUM, supra note 3, at 225 (explaining that a substantial amount of funds placed
in offshore accounts take the form of call money. Call accounts may be same day value, 2-day
notice and 7-day notice accounts .. Call money is more attractive to various investors because of
its comparative liquidity when compared with time or fixed term deposits. Although a time or
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relevant negotiations and transfer of funds by Citizens Bank on behalf of
Peruvia National Bank to Abbey Bank may give rise to a variety of
formally documented deposit contracts, which are in reality loan contracts.
The depositor concerned (Peruvia National Bank) is the lender of the
funds, while the depository institution (Abbey Bank) is the borrower. The
eurocurrency deposit in question may be ( 1) a time or fixed term deposit
evidenced by a written contract; (2) a time deposit evidenced by a
certificate of deposit; and (3) a call deposit or call money. A time or fixed
term deposit, must be distinguished from a call deposit or call money.
While a fixed term deposit or time deposit is an interest bearing
deposit with a specific maturity, a call deposit does not have any specific
maturity. Call money is so called because it is said to be "on call," that is
it is left on deposit without any specific maturity date and is withdraw-able
usually on a day's notice. Where a time or fixed term deposit is evidenced
by a written contract, the written contract, which specifies the terms of the
contract, constitutes an acceptance by the bank of the terms of the loan
negotiated. The terms of the time deposit contract2 5 will usually include
( 1) the currency of account; (2) the duration of the deposit; (3) the interest
rate; (4) the date of the deal; (5) the value and maturity dates; (6) the
amount of interest; (7) the place of repayment; and (8) the payment
mechanisms and processes. According to current practice, call deposits
are neither evidenced by formal documentation nor standardized
confirmations. The documentation of call accounts are, the statements that
are sent by the depository bank, upon request via SWIFT, to the
depositor. 26 Call deposits are not formally documented, that being the
fastest moving sector of the interbank deposit market, the issuance and
safekeeping of formal documentation becomes too cumbersome, if not too
expensive. In the above scenario, if the deposit of "Peruvia National
Bank" is a call deposit, "Abbey Bank" will send only a statement to
"Peruvia National Bank" upon request from the latter.
In concrete terms, the above euro-dollar deal will take place in the
following manner: assuming Abbey Bank has no correspondent
relationship with Citizens Bank, but has a correspondent relationship with
another U.S. bank called National Bank, the transfer may be effected with

fixed term deposit bears a higher rate of interest, withdrawal prior to maturity attracts a penalty).
25. For some banks, for example, the Channel Islands Branch of the Royal Bank of
Canada, the time or fixed term deposit contract is also referred to as a Fixed Term Deposit
Confirmation. Despite its name, this is the only documentation which a depositor of funds
receives, showing the amount of funds held at a eurobank. According to market practice then,
this documentation, although referred to as a confirmation, constitutes a fixed term contract.
26. See generally Edmund M.A. Kwaw, GREY AREAS IN EUROCURRENCY DEPOSITS AND
PLACEMENTS: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME (1990).
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the services of the correspondent bank. Following instructions from
Abbey Bank, Citizens Bank will effect a transfer via CHIPS to National
Bank for the correspondent account of Abbey Bank. 27
Upon receipt of the transfer message National Bank will, in turn,
credit the vostro account of Abbey Bank. National Bank will then effect a
transfer message to Abbey Bank using a funds transfer media such as
SWIFT. Upon receipt of the transfer message, Abbey Bank will credit the
account of Peruvia National Bank with the amount of $10 million and it
will credit its nostro account with National Bank.
According to current practice, a necessary and final safeguard against
the possibility of dealing errors is provided by the exchange of
confirmations between the various participants. 28 In our present scenario,
a confirmation will be sent to Peruvia National Bank by Abbey Bank
showing the funds deposited with the latter. In general, a confirmation
sent by a receiving bank (Abbey Bank) to the depositor (Peruvia National
Bank), does not constitute an acknowledgment of funds received by the
receiving bank (Abbey Bank), but only an agreement concerning the
interbank placement of the funds to be received. The terms negotiated
between Peruvia National Bank and the receiving bank (Abbey Bank), as
documented on the confirmation form, onl~ become effective upon the
receipt of the funds by the receiving bank. 9 With respect to interbank
placements, the confirmation sent to the transmitting bank is usually the
only documentation concerning the placement of funds, which the bank
receives. Such a confirmation, is thus, considered to be a contract between
the banks concerned.
Where the fixed term or time deposit is not evidenced by a certificate
of deposit, a fixed term/time deposit contract or term deposit confirmation
is sent to the depositor by the eurobank. This is also the only
documentation showing funds held at the eurobank, which the depositor
receives from the eurobank. Upon the receipt of funds by the receiving
bank then, the confirmation, in addition to being ( 1) a confirmation of the
transfer and (2) an acceptance by the receiving bank of the terms, is also
(3) a fixed term deposit contract, or time deposit contract. Although a
reference is being made to the receipt of funds, the actual specie in dollars,
is not actually received by the receiving bank in the U .K. The term,

27. If Abbey Bank has a correspondent relationship with Citizens Bank, the transfer
operation will take place in the same bank, that is, by an in-house transfer.
28. London Code of Conduct: For Principals and Brokering Firms in the Wholesale
Markets, FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, 8, at ml 70-72 (1999), available at
http:/www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited on Oct. 20, 2004).
29. Some confirmations will have a stipulation to that effect.
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receipt of funds, denotes the process through which a credit to the vostro
account of the receiving bank, Abbey Bank, and a corresponding credit to
the accounts of Citizens Bank and National Bank at the Federal Reserve
produce a payment to Abbey Bank.
As a result of the above transactions, specific accounting entries will
be made in this manner. The books of Abbey Bank will show a credit in
favor of Peruvia National Bank to the tune of $10 million and a
corresponding liability on its own part. In the books of National Bank, the
vostro, or due to account of Abbey Bank will be credited with the amount
of $10 million. The books of Citizens Bank will show a debit of the same
amount with respect to the account of Peruvia National Bank. The book
entries made with Abbey Bank in the U .K. thus, reflect the corresponding
entries made in the books of its correspondent, National Bank, in the U.S.
This, in turn, reflects the changing nature of the claims involved. They are
therefore, not independent accounts and have sometimes been referred to
as mirror accounts.30
By giving up its claim against Citizens Bank, Peruvia National Bank
now acquires a claim against a U .K. bank, Abbey Bank. Likewise, the
original claim held by Peruvia National Bank against Citizens Bank now
becomes a claim of the U.K. bank-Abbey Bank-against the U.S. bank,
National Bank. Payment or settlement as between the two U.S. banks,
Citizens Bank and National Bank, will usually be effected by the transfer
of funds from and to accounts that both banks maintain with the federal
reserve.
Thus, although Peruvia National Bank regards itself as holding
dollars in Abbey Bank in the United Kingdom, the funds, which are the
subject matter of the deposit and transfer operation, never leave the United
States. Because Abbey Bank possesses a correspondent account with
National Bank in the U.S., a transfer from the Federal Reserve account of
Citizens Bank to that of National Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank in
New York, moves the funds from Citizens Bank in the U.S. to Abbey
Bank in the United Kingdom. It is this kind of transfer operation that some
writers have in mind when they argue that, in the funds transfer process,
the funds (in this case dollars) never leave the country of issue. 31 The
scenario involving Peruvia National Bank is intended to illustrate what has
come to be accepted as the usual practice of the eurodollar deposit
operation in particular and eurocurrency operations in general. 32

30. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 160.
31. STIGUM, supra note 3, at 200; HAINDL, supra note 6, at 50.
32. Roy M. Goode, Concepts of Payment in Relation to the Expropriation or Freezing of
Bank Deposits, J.I.B.L., 82-83, (2) (1987); see also Marco A. Jagmeti, Money and Payment 9
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The Deposit Repayment Process

The repayment of a eurocurrency deposit may be effected in two
main ways. The first way of repaying a eurocurrency deposit is with the
use of "in-house" or correspondent bank transfers. 33 The second method
is to effect payment via the country of issue of the currency that is the
subject matter of the deposit contract.
i. Repayment by In-House Transfers
An in-house transfer generally refers to the transfer of funds between
accounts held at either the same branch of a bank or at different branches
of the same bank. Where two parties, A and B, maintain accounts at the
same branch and A wants to make payment to B, an in-house transfer may
be used to effect payment. The bank concerned merely debits the account
of A and credits the account of B. In the international context, the use of
an in-house transfer to effect payment may take place with or without the
intermediary assistance of a correspondent bank. Assume that Peruvia
National Bank, in the scenario used above, wishes to be repaid its $10
million held at Abbey Bank in the U.K., an in-house transfer, without the
assistance of a correspondent bank, could be used to effect payment. This
is possible where both Abbey Bank and Peruvia National Bank have
correspondent account relationships with the same bank. Suppose both
Peruvia National Bank and Abbey Bank maintain accounts with another
bank in France called Banque Internationale. All that is necessary to repay
the deposit of Peruvia National Bank, is for Abbey Bank to debit the
account of Peruvia National Bank and then instruct Banque Internationale
to transfer the funds from its account into that of Peruvia National Bank.
Banque Internationale will then debit the vostro account of Abbey Bank
and credit the vostro account of Peruvia National Bank. The transfer of
funds between accounts maintained at the same bank is the in-house
transfer.

ii. Repayment by Correspondent Bank Transfers

In the international context, where the concerned banks or parties do
not maintain an account with the same branch of a bank, the services of a
correspondent bank are usually required to facilitate the transfer of funds
from payor to payee at the different banks. Correspondent banking refers
to the system of reciprocal bank account relationships between banks.

INT'LBUS. L., 95 (1981); Kwaw, supra note 26.

33. Hal Scott, Where are the Eurodollars?-0.ffshore Funds Transfers 3 BANKING AND
FIN. L. REV. XX 282-86 (1988-89).
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Although correspondent banking is also used in the domestic context,
in the international context it facilitates receipts and payments of foreign
currency. In a very simple correspondent bank transfer, a sending or
originating bank, upon the receipt of instructions from its customer, will
effect a transfer message to another bank (the receiving bank) to make
payment to a payee who maintains an account at the receiving bank.
Payment, as between the sending or originating bank and the receiving
bank, is effected by corresponding debit and credit entries to
correspondent accounts maintained with each other. This usually means
that the originating or sending bank must have sufficient funds in its
correspondent account with the receiving bank to cover the amount of the
transfer.
In international banking transactions and eurocurrency transactions
for that matter, correspondent banks may be used to transfer funds either
to and from ( 1) parties who hold funds with banks outside countries of
issue or (2) parties who hold funds with banks inside countries of issue. In
the latter situation, this usually involves the use of the clearing and
settlement system of the country of issue.

iii. Repayment via the Clearing System of the Country of Issue
The repayment of eurocurrency does not have to pass through the
clearing and settlement system of the country of issue where in-house and
correspondent bank transfers are used. However, this is the current
practice. When a eurobank accepts a deposit denominated in the currency
of another country it undertakes certain obligations, including the
obligation to repay, which in most cases is carried out by causin~ acts that
take place in the country of issue of the currency concerned. 4 This is
because, as a general rule, most payment obligations involving the
delivery and collection of eurocurrency take place in the country of issue
according to the rules of its clearing system. In the scenario used above,
the repayment obligation of Abbey Bank, located in the U.K., although
capable of being performed outside the U.S. in the manner described
above, will, according to current practice, be performed in the U.S. This
will be done by the delivery and collection of dollars in National Bank or
another bank in the U.S. nominated by the customer, Peruvia National
Bank.
Since repayments of eurocurrency are so frequently made through the
country of issue of the currency concerned, as opposed to the use of in34. See Goode, supra note 32; Jagmeti, supra note 32; CARREAU, supra note 1, at 161-63;
Edmund M. A. Kwaw, Determining the Proper Law to Govern the Eurocurrency Deposit
Contract 18 QUEEN'S L. J. 440, 445 (1993).
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house and correspondent bank transfers, it is possible to argue that it is an
implied term of eurocurrency deposit contracts that repayments are to be
made via the clearing and settlement system of the country of issue. 35 This
is also dictated by practical considerations.
Only a globally organized system for clearing and netting large sums
in a variety of currencies, will lead to an efficient functioning of the
repayments process. 36 Since no such organization exists, all payments of
eurocurrency have to go through the only systems which currently
possesses the facilities for collecting and netting large sums of foreign
currency: the clearing systems of the countries of issue. 37 This is purely
practical, given that ( 1) central banks of the countries of issue of various
major currencies are the only ones which will accept the responsibility for
supplying unlimited quantities of that currency and (2) these central banks
are committed only to their own clearing banks.
Unlike the domestic banking context then, in the eurocurrency
deposit context there are three stages in the repayment process, namely ( 1)
the demand for payment; (2) the preparation by the offshore bank to effect
payment; and (3) actual payment, that is, the delivery of funds by a bank
in the country of issue. While all three stages may take place in the same
bank in the domestic context, only the first two stages take place at the
eurobank in the eurocurrency deposit context. Thus, in the above scenario,
when Peruvia National Bank wishes to be repaid its deposit, it will make a
demand to be repaid in the U.K. at the branch of Abbey Bank where the
deposit is maintained. Since Abbey Bank does not have access to the
funds, it can only instruct its correspondent in the country of issue to make
the relevant transfer to the account of Peruvia National Bank, against a
promise by Abbey Bank to subsequently provide cover. 38 Abbey Bank
consequently sends a transfer message for that purpose. This is the second
stage in the process of repaying eurocurrency or what this work refers to
as the preparation to make repayment. The third stage, the actual delivery
of the funds: payment per se, although capable of avoiding the clearing
system of the U.S., as explained above, will, in most cases, take place in
the U.S. The account of Peruvia National Bank is then credited and the
corresponding debits and credits are effected in the accounts of Citizens
Bank and National Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank.

35. Goode, supra note 32.
36. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 161; see also JOHN E. HOFFMAN, JR., THE IRANIAN ASSETS
LITIGATION, IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IN 1980, 350 (Martha L. Landwehr. Ed., Matthew Bender 1980).
37. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 161; Hoffinan, supra note 36, at 350.
38. Urech, supra note 1, at 16.
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The Interbank Placement Operation

As observed at the beginning of this chapter, the deposit side of the
eurocurrency market also includes the bank-to-bank deposit of funds, or
the interbank placement. The mechanics of the interbank placement
process may be described using the hypothetical eurocurrency deposit
operation discussed above. Using this scenario then, assuming that Abbey
Bank, after receiving the deposit of Peruvia National Bank does not want
the funds to sit idle on its books in the U .K., it may decide to place it in the
interbank market by depositing it with another eurobank in France
(Banque Internationale). This assumes that Banque Internationale is
prepared to pay a higher rate for the funds. If Banque Internationale also
cannot find immediate use for the funds deposited with it, it will also
deposit it in the interbank market. At each stage in this interbank
placement process, the next bank pays a slightly higher rate than the
previous bank does. The margins involved in the interbank market are
usually very small. It is important to note, that the redepositing of the
funds in the interbank market, does not add to the final extension of credit
in the financial markets, but only involves the passing of funds from bank
to bank.
The mechanics of the interbank placement operation involving some
or all of the above parties could take place in the following manner. Abbey
Bank will contact Banque Internationale over the phone and request the
latter to provide it with its bid or deposit rates for deposits of various
maturities in both France and England. Assuming the rate available in the
Paris branch of Banque Internationale is higher, Abbey Bank will
negotiate with Banque Internationale (Paris) to place the $10 million for
example, for one month, in the Paris branch of the latter bank. After an
agreement is reached, the relevant book entries are made. If Banque
Internationale also cannot find immediate use for the funds, it may also
decide to deposit it with its London branch, which may decide to take the
deposit on its books at approximately 1/32 of 1 per cent over the rate paid
by the Paris branch. In this case the second funds placement takes place
between two branches of the same bank.

i. The Role of Brokerage Firms
The above interbank placement operations could also take place with
the assistance of brokerage firms. For example, if the London branch of
Banque Internationale decides to invest the $10 million deposited with it at
a profit, it may seek to lend the funds at as high a rate as possible. The use
of a brokerage firm becomes indispensable in this context. Since it is
generally difficult to find the appropriate bank, willing to pay the
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appropriate rate, brokers, who possess a comparative advantage in the
possession of the relevant information, act as intermediaries between
banks in the interbank market. Thus, the London branch of Banque
Internationale may request a brokerage firm to provide it with the bid or
deposit rates offered by various banks for call, 7-day, 30-day, 90-day,180day and 270-day deposits, denominated in a variety of currencies. On this
basis, the London branch of Banque Internationale is able to make an
informed decision as to whether it wants to place the funds or swap
currencies. Assuming it decides to place the funds at a bank in Japan,
Sumitomo Bank, it will convey this decision to the broker. The broker will
then contact the eurocurrency dealing department of Sumitomo Bank by
phone or telex, to close the deal. The broker earns a fee of about 1./32of1
per cent. Confirmation of the deal is transmitted to the London branch of
Banque Internationale and the message to transfer funds to the Japanese
bank, is transmitted via SWIFT, to correspondent banks in Japan, which
then effect the transfer.
As already noted above, as between banks, the interbank placement
of eurocurrency is not formally documented, only confirmations are sent
between the parties. Thus, while the deposit contract between Peruvia
National Bank and Abbey Bank may be formally evidenced by a
certificate of deposit or a fixed term deposit contract, the interbank
placement operations between Abbey Bank and Banque Internationale in
Paris, or that between Banque Internationale in London and Sumitomo
Bank in Japan, are not evidenced by formal contractual documents but by
mere entries on the books of the banks concerned. All transactions are
carried out informally via the telephone, telex or fax and confirmations of
the deal are exchanged. Confirmations of financial deals may also be made
by telephone, in writing or using other electronic media.
Although there is no standardized format for such confirmations, for
banks operating in the London wholesale markets, the London Code of
Conducf 9 recommends that all such confirmations sent by banks and
other financial institutions engaged in wholesale market deals, include all
the details of the transaction concerned. 40 The current practice, however,
is, that banks participating in the international money markets usually
include their own terms and conditions of trading, in addition to the details
of the deal, on such confirmations. According to a Royal Bank of Canada
(RBC) standing order, for example, offshore branches of the RBC in
issuing confirmations of deposit deals (whether by telephone or in
39. London Code of Conduct: For Principals and Brokering Firms in the Wholesale
Markets, supra note 28, at 8-9.
40. Id. at 9.
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writing), must include details including; ( 1) the banks full name and
address, including telephone and fax numbers; (2) the type of transaction;
(3) the counterparty's full name and address; (4) the amounts and
currencies involved; (5) the value and maturity dates; (6) the interest rates
agreed upon, including the basis of calculation, that is, whether 360 or 365
days; and (7) details concerning payment. 41 It is therefore reasonable to
infer that Sumitomo Bank will send a confirmation to the London branch
of Banque Internationale containing similar terms. 42 As mentioned before,
since such written confirmations are the only documents showing monies
held at the other banks, which the banks placing the funds will receive,
such confirmations are regarded as contracts according to market practice.
Ill. THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
The deposit and placement of eurocurrency, and the process of
making payments via electronic funds transfers, gives rise to legal
relationships between the involved participants. These relationships
include that between the: (1) depositary bank and the customer; (2)
depositary bank and the correspondent bank; (3) customer and the
correspondent bank; and (4) beneficiary/destination bank and the payee.
Although these same legal relationships could occur in the domestic
context, the legal significance of these relationships differs in the
eurobanking context.

A.

The Relationship Between Customer and Eurobank

In the eurobanking context, the relationship between the customer
and the eurobank can be divided into two stages, namely the depositary
relationship and the funds transfer relationship. The depositary
relationship is concerned with the opening of the eurocurrency account
and the subsequent transfer of funds into that account. Whereas the funds
transfer relationship is concerned with the transfer of funds from the
account into another account specified by the customer.

1.

The depositary relationship
Similar to the deposit relationship in the domestic context, the legal

41. Royal Bank of Canada: Standing Order No. 8.05, Deal Confirmations Revised 1992,
Royal Bank of Canada, London [hereinafter RBC Standing Order No. 8.05].
42. It is the current practice for the Royal Bank of Canada located in London, for example,
to treat telephone confirmations as only temporary. Telephone confirmations, according to RBC
Standing Order No. 8.05, are to be recorded and kept until all transactions are paper confirmed
and settlement effected. Written confirmations are also to be kept until matching confirmations
are received from the other bank.
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character of the depositary relationship in the eurobanking context is that
of a contract and falls within the general common law rules regarding
ordinary accounts in the banker-customer relationship. 43 Like the
relationship between the banker and the customer regarding ordinary or
general deposits in the common law, the relationship between the
depositary eurobank and the customer commences immediately when both
parties begin negotiations and enter into a relationship that is to be part of
the eventual contract. 44 Generally, negotiations that do not result in any
agreement, cannot establish a relationship. 45
The contractual depositary relationship between the eurobank and the
customer, like the ordinary banker-customer deposit relationship, consists
of reciprocal rights and duties that are founded on the practices and usages
of domestic banking as well as the eurocurrency market. The classic
statement of the nature of the reciprocal rights and duties of a depositing
customer and bank, in the domestic context, is that of Atkin L.J. in
Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation. 46 According to Atkin, in the
domestic context, when a customer deposits money with a bank,
[t]he bank undertakes to receive money and to collect bills
for its customer's account. The proceeds so received are not to
be held in trust for the customer, but the bank borrows the
proceeds and undertakes to repay them. The promise to repay
is to repay at the branch of the bank where the account is kept,
and during banking hours ... The customer on his part
undertakes to exercise reasonable care in executing his written
orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate a forgery. I
think it is necessarily a term of such contract that the bank is
not liable to pay the customer the full amount of his balance
until he demands payment from the bank at the branch at
which the current account is kept. (emphasis added)
Thus, in both the traditional domestic banker customer deposit

43. It is very important to observe that there are varieties of banker-customer relationships.
For instance, the relationship between the bank and its customer when the bank provides
financial advice is considered to be fiduciary. Where a customer places personal property in a
bank for safe keeping, the relationship becomes one of bailment. See MARGARET H. OGILVIE
CANADIAN BANKING LAW 435 (Carwell 2d ed. 1998); Foley v. Hill, 9 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1848);
Burnt v. Westminster Bank Ltd., 1 Q.B. 742, 3 All E.R. 81 (1965.).
44. MARK HAPGOOD PAGET'S LAW OF BANKING 161 (Butterworths, 11th ed. 1996); Ross
CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 139-41 (Clarendon Press, 1997).
45. Id.
46. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp., 3 K.B. 110, (Eng. C.A. 1921).
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relationship and the eurobanking relationship, the legal character of the
contractual relationship between the bank and its customer is that of debtor
and creditor. The depositor is the creditor and the bank is the debtor. 47 The
deposit is a loan, and in the absence of any special agreement that ~ualifies
the relationship, 48 the deposit becomes the property of the bank. 4 In this
traditional relationship the bank is not the bailee of the customer and does
not hold the money in any fiduciary capacity. The legal title to the funds
passes to the bank,50 which has the right to mix it with other funds and to
use as it sees fit. A liability in favor of the depositor is thus created. Since
title to the money passes to the bank until demand is made, the bank
cannot be said to have a lien on such funds that it owns. 51
This is where the similarity ends between the domestic deposit
relationship and the eurobanking relationship. The traditional common law
rules and the approach of the eurobanking system differ when it comes to
the repayment of the deposit by the bank.

2.

The problem of repayment and the place of repayment

Lord Atkin' s well cited dictum provides that the promise of a bank to
repay funds held on deposit is to do so at the branch of the bank where the
account is kept. This approach of Lord Atkin with respect to the
repayment obligation of a bank is based on an idea, derived from the era of

47. Joachimson, 3 K.B. at 110; Foley, 9 Eng. Rep. at 1002; R. v. Davenport, 1 All E.R. 602
(Crim. App. 1954); Laing v. Bank of New South Wales, 69 W.N 318 (N.S.W.S. Ct. 1952).
Although the High Court decision in Laing was reversed by the Privy Council, it was not with
respect to the nature of the banker customer relationship. See generally New York County Nat'!
Bankv. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (1904); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank 321 F. 2d 15 (2nd
Cir. 1963); Royal Bank of Canada v. Boyce, [1996], 57 D.L.R. 683; Bank of Ottawa v. Hood
[1908], 42 S.C.R. 231; Everly v. Dunkley [1912], 27 O.L.R. 414 (relevant U.S. and Canadian
decisions).
48. Deposits made with banks could be divided into two classes: special deposits and
general deposits. With special deposits, the bank becomes the bailee of the customer and title to
the money still remains with the customer. It has been held for instance that a deposit of money
or property merely for safe keeping, is a special deposit. Such a special deposit may be in a safe
deposit box or otherwise kept separately. The only determining criteria seems to be whether the
depositor intended that the funds are (1) for a specific purpose not contemplating a credit to a
general account; (2) to be segregated; and (3) to be returned intact on demand. With general
deposits, the money is deposited in accordance with normal banking customs. The depositor, for
his/her own convenience, parts with title to the money and lends it to the bank. The bank in
consideration of the loan of the money and the right to use it as it sees fit, agrees to refund the
money either in whole or in part, upon demand. Foley, 2 H.L. 28, 9 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1848);
Royal Trust Co. v. Mo/sons Bank [1912] D.L.R. 478.
49. Foley, 2 H.L. 28, 9 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1848); Royal Trust Co. [1912] D.L.R. 478.
50. See Davenport 1 All E.R. 602 (Crim. App. 1954).
51. See Liberty Sav. Assoc. v. Sun Bank, 572 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1978); SA MICHIE ON
BANKS AND BANKING 37 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. et. Al. eds., 2003).
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the goldsmiths and the use of currency and coins in modem times, that
money on deposit is specie or cash that has a situs or location. Where
money is specie or cash held by a branch of a bank where a customer has
an account it makes sense that the customer has to make a demand at that
branch for repayment of his or her deposit. 52 The traditional common law
approach to repayment is limited when it is applied to the eurocurrency
market.
As indicated above, when a customer such as Peruvia National Bank
transfers funds from its account with Citizens bank in the United States
into a eurodollar account with Abbey Bank in the United Kingdom no
transfer, in the sense of a transfer of specie or cash, takes place. The
obligation of Citizens Bank is not assigned to Abbey Bank. What happens
is that upon the transfer of funds from Citizens Bank to Abbey Bank, the
obligation of Citizens Bank to pay is notionally extinguished and is
replaced by the obligation of Abbey Bank to pay the same amount that is
transferred. However, because no transfer of cash or specie has actually
taken place, Peruvia National Bank cannot obtain payment from Abbey
Bank. It can demand payment from Abbey Bank, but because Abbey
Bank, per se, has no funds, the only obligation of Abbey bank is to initiate
the process that will result in Peruvia National Bank obtaining payment
either via the clearing and settlement process in the United States or via inhouse or correspondent bank transfers.
The shortcomings of the traditional common law respecting payment,
as well as other matters, was exposed in Bank Markhazi Iran v. Citibank,53
and Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. 54
i.Bank Markhazi Iran v. Citibank
In Bank Makhazi Iran v. Citibank, President Carter of the United
States, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,55

52 . For an extensive discussion of the origins of the concept of payment see PAUL
EINZIG PRIMITIVE MONEY (2d ed., Pergamon Press 1966) (1949); Kwaw, supra note 26, at §
6; Redefining the Concept of Payment, 2 CANADIAN J. INT'L Bus. L. & POLICY 199 (1997);
F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY (Clarendon Press, 5th ed. 1992); Benjamin
Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History: On commerce Tyranny and the
Modern Law of Mon ey, 25 0SGOODE HALL L. 1. 115 (1987) .
53. Writ dated 30 November 1979, Bank Markazi Iran v. Citibank, N.A., No. 1979-B-5903
(Q.B.).
54. Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. , 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B. Comm.
Ct. 1987).
55 . 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2003). The statute, where relevant states as follows: Sec. 1702(a)(l)
At times and to the extent specified in § 1701 of this title, the President may, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-(A)
investigate, regulate, or prohibit- (i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit
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imposed a freeze on the worldwide assets of the Government of Iran in
response to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, and the capture of
hostages found in the compound, as well as the perceived threat to
international world order posed by the Iranian regime. 56 At the time of the
freeze order, Iranian assets that were subject to the freeze order, were in
the region of $6 billion and were held at the London branches of U.S.
banks. These assets collectively belonged to Bank Markazi Iran
In November 1979, Bank Markhazi Iran, seeking to challenge the
legality of the freeze order, commenced an action in London against the
U.S. banks. The statement of claim of Bank Markhazi Iran, among other
things, stated that ( 1) the defendant was indebted to Bank Markazi Iran for
certain amounts in U.S. dollars, money which was held on account for
Bank Markazi Iran at the London branch of the defendant, and (2) Bank
Markazi Iran also owed payments of interest which had been demanded
but had not been repaid. 57
In their pleadings, Citibank, as well as the other defendant banks, put
forward various arguments that they said justified their refusal to pay. One
of these arguments is important for this article. Citibank argued that
payment could not be made because of the freeze order, which explicitly
referred to assets held by U.S. persons overseas. Citibank further argued,
that even if the court in London held that the freeze order was void in the
U.K., the order still made it illegal for the U.S. banks to make payment.
The defendant also argued that it was well known to the depositor, Bank
Markhazi Iran, that no payments could be made per se in London without
the transfers going through the New York clearing system. Therefore, any
payment made would immediately be subject to the freeze order. Payment
to Bank Markhazi Iran was therefore impossible. In making this argument,
the defendants in this case thus, sought to draw a distinction between the
repayment of an ordinary domestic deposit, and the repayment of a
eurocurrency deposit. Unlike a domestic deposit, Bank Markhazi Iran's

or payments between, by, through or to any banking institution to the extent that such transfers
or payments involve any interests of any foreign country or national thereof ... (B) investigate,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit any acquisition, holding
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation, exportation of, or dealing in
... any property in which any foreign country or national thereof has an interest; by any person,
or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
56. Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks and
National Laws, 64 N.Y.U L. REV. 733, 747 (1989). In 1979, a period of 10 days after the
hostage incident in Teheran, the president issued an executive order, blocking any official assets
of Iran subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or which came into the possession of
persons who were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
57. Id. at 750, citing n. 54: Writ dated 30 Nov. 1979, Bank Markazi Iran, N.A., No. 1979B-5903 (Q.B.) (on file at N.Y.U. L. REv.).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss1/4

22

Kwaw: The Evolving Law On The Eurobank-Customer Relationship And The Co

2004]

The Law on the Eurobank Relationship

109

deposit could not be repaid where the account was held.
The case never went to trial, thus it is difficult to determine if the
Court would have redefined the repayment obligation of banks, and held
that Bank Markhazi Iran had to be repaid in the United States, or whether
it would have adhered to the traditional approach. Both French and
English courts denied summary judgement and commissioned groups of
experts to look into the issues raised and set dates for trial. However, all
suits were subsequently abandoned when the hostages were released as a
result of the Algiers Accords of January 19, 1981. 58 The issue of whether
the Courts will recognize the developing eurobanking reality and modify
or move away from the well known dictum of Lord Atkin and redefine the
law on repayment or, on the other hand, adhere to the traditional approach,
was answered somewhat in Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust
Co. This case is also important because it also raised other issues
regarding the adequacy of the common law on the banker customer
relationship.
ii.Libyan Arab Foreign Bank. v. Citibank
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Citibank also involved the imposition
of a freeze, pursuant to an Executive Order5 9 issued by President Ronald
Reagan, on the assets of Libya by the United States of America. At the
time of the freeze, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, was wholly owned by the
Central Bank of Libya, and had a substantial amount of funds on deposit
with Bankers Trust Co., a U.S. bank, in London and in New York.
The relationship between Libyan Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers
Trust Co. began in July 1972, when Libyan Arab Foreign Bank appointed
Bankers Trust Co. of New York as its correspondent bank on a reciprocal
basis. 60 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank later opened a eurodollar account with

58. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
Jan. 18, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223 (entered into force Jan. 19, 1981). Under the accords, the Iranian
assets that stood on the books of the overseas branches of the U.S. banks together with interest
payments were to be transferred into an escrow account with the Bank of England. This account
was to be in the name of the Algerian Central Bank. The funds were then to be released to Iran
upon the safe departure of the hostages.
59. See Exec. Order No. 12, 544, 51 Fed. Reg., 1235, (Jan. 8, 1986). The Order imposed a
freeze on all Libyan government owned property in the U.S., or "within the possession or
control of U.S. persons, including overseas branches of U.S. persons." See also Exec. Order No.
12, 543, 51 Fed. Reg. 873 (Jan. 7, 1986). There was also another executive order issued by the
president before this one. Under this first executive order, all imports into the United States of
goods of Libyan origin and exports of goods to Libya, were prohibited. Also prohibited by this
first executive order was the provision of credit by U.S. persons to Libya.
60. Mahvash Alerasool, Extraterritorial Powers: Libya's Frozen Assets and the Question
ofthe External Application of the Freeze Order, 18 INT'LCURRENCYREV. 12, 14 (1987).
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Bankers Trust Co. in Paris that same year. In April 1973, Libya Arab
Foreign Bank opened a 7-day notice account with Bankers Trust Co. in
London into which it transferred the balance of the Paris account that it
had closed. 61 In December 1973, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank also closed
its Bankers Trust Co.-New York Account and transferred the balance to
its Bankers Trust Co.-London account. 62 The eurodollar account that
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank held with Bankers Trust in London was an
interest bearing account which was used for its day to day operations as
well as for investment purposes. 63 In November 1977, Bankers Trust Co.
became dissatisfied with the profit earning potential of the London
account and operating difficulties. Bankers Trust Co. therefore, proposed
the use of a "managed account system" to manage the affairs of Libyan
Arab Foreign Bank. This was comprised of a current account to be
maintained at Bankers Trust Co.-New York and a call account to be
maintained at Bankers Trust Co.-London.
An agreement was reached in December 1980 under which Libyan
Arab Foreign Bank would open a demand account in New York with a
minimum balance of$500,000 and a call account in London. The Bankers
Trust Co. -New York account was to be a non-interest bearing account and
the daily account operations of Libyan Arab Foreign Bank were shifted to
New York. Under this managed account system, all transactions were to
pass through New York. Pursuant to this, Bankers Trust installed a cash
connector in the Libya office of Libyan Arab Foreign Bank that enabled
the latter to have direct access to computerized accounts held in Bankers
Trust Co.-New York. All credit and debit instructions were to be sent via
this cash connector to Bankers Trust Co.-New York where the
transactions would be effected. 64 Under the agreement, at 9 a.m. each
banking day, Bankers Trust Co. was required to determine the closing
balance for the previous day with respect to the New York account. When
the balance was in excess of $500,000, the excess was to be transferred to
the London account. The transfer was to be in such multiples of $100,000
as would leave a maximum balance of $599,000 in the New York
account. 65 If the balance in the New York account fell below $500,000, it
was agreed that a compensating transfer was to be made from the London
account.
Two days before the imposition of the U.S. freeze order, Bankers

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Libya Arab Foreign. Bankv. Bankers Trust Co., 1987 Q.B. 728, 734 (U.K.).
Alerasool, supra note 60, at 15.
Id.
Libyan Arab Foreign. Bank, 1987 Q.B. at 735.
Id. at 737.
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Trust Co. failed to transfer funds from New York to the London account
pursuant to the managed account arrangement. At the time of the freeze
order on January 8th, 1986, the balance in the London account was $131
million and the balance in the New York account, was $161 million in
excess of the stipulated $500,000 maximum balance.
After the freeze was imposed, Libya Arab Foreign Bank made
various attempts to secure repayment. First, on April 28, 1986, it sent a
telex to Bankers Trust Co.-London demanding repayment of the balance. 66
A similar telex was also sent to Bankers Trust Co.-New York demanding
payment of the $161 million that had been frozen in New York. Bankers
Trust Co., in response, sent a telex refusing both demands for payment. 67
Libya Arab Foreign Bank therefore, commenced legal action against
Bankers Trust Co. in the High Court in London claiming, among other
things: (1) payment of the $131 million from the London account; (2)
payment of the $161 million from the US account which should have been
transferred before the freeze; (3) payment of an amount of $1.8 million
representing the back values of transfers from the New York account to
the London account which Bankers Trust Co., between April 1984 and
October 1986, had failed to effect; and (4) damages for non-payment of its
payment instructions.
Bankers Trust Co., drawing a distinction between the repayment
obligation in a domestic banking context and in a eurobanking context,
advanced the argument that Libya Arab Foreign Bank could not demand
payment in London because it was an express term of the arrangements
with Libya Arab Foreign Bank that all payments would go through New
York. Further, the nature of the repayment process of the eurodollar
transaction required the performance of acts, namely the use of the
clearing and settlement process in New York. Such acts would be illegal
pursuant to the freeze order.
At first instance, Justice Evans observed that the correspondence
which had taken place between Libya Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers

66. Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd' s Rep. 259, 268 (Q.B.
1988). The telex stated, "We hereby instruct you to pay to us at 10:30 am U.K. time on
Thursday 1st May 1986 out of our U.S. dollar account number 025-13828 at Bankers Trust
London, the sum of U.S. dollars $131 million. We make demand accordingly. This sum is to be
paid to us in London at the said time and date, either by negotiable banker's draft in such
amount (U.S. Dollars 131,000,000.00) drawn on Bankers Trust London, payable in London to
ourselves (Libyan Arab Foreign Bank) or to our order. Alternatively we would accept payment
in cash although we would prefer to be provided with a banker's draft as aforesaid."
67. See Alerasool, supra note 60, at 16. (The telex stated as follows: "We regret we are
unable to comply because any such transfer and/or payment would be in contravention of the
January 8th 1986 Presidential freeze covering your funds with us.").
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Trust Co, in which it had been agreed that all transactions would pass
through the New York account, was nothing more than an agreement to
pass transactions through New York. By merely agreeing to pass funds
through New York, Libya Arab Foreign Bank had not waived its right to
deal with the London branch. 68 In the eyes of the court, the 1980
agreement was only concerned with three things: (1) the opening of the
demand account in New York; (2) the setting up of the managed account
procedures; and (3) the variation of the notice period for the London
account. Based on this observation, Justice Evans saw no need to imply a
term into the contract to the effect that Libya Arab Foreign Bank could no
longer exercise its rights over the London account. 69
Justice Evans also held that although the dollar obligations which
took place in London were settled in the New York clearing system, this
did not make New York the place of performance of the obligation of
Bankers Trust Co. This was because the telex sent by Libya Arab Foreign
Bank had clearly stated that payment was to be made in London, in cash.
This argument of the court seems to suggest that in the absence of
any express stipulation in the form of a telex or any other documentation
which varies a eurocurrency deposit contract, the place of settlement and
clearing of the currency concerned would be the place of performance.
The law of that place would then govern the performance of the payment
obligation. In this respect, the argument of the court appears to make a
hole in the traditional common law approach regarding the place of
repayment. The place of repayment is seen as not being absolute, but is
rather dependent on the facts of the case. Where there is some stipulation
in the contract that some other place, and not the place where the account
is kept is the place of repayment, then that stipulation will apply.
According to the Court, however, since the place of repayment, as stated
in the telex, was London, the place of ultimate settlement was irrelevant
and there was no need for the court to make a choice between the
traditional common law approach and the eurobanking approach.
Consequently, the court held that the argument of Bankers Trust Co. that
payment would be illegal had no basis. 70
On October 16th, 1986, Justice Evans in the high court granted
summary judgement in favour of Libya Arab Foreign Bank. He stated that
although his decision might lead to Bankers Trust Co. suffering penalties
in the U.S., his duty was to enforce the law of the United Kingdom as he

68. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (order granting summary judgment) in JO MIDDLE
at 48 [hereinafter Summary Judgment].
69. Id. at 49.
70. Summary Judgment, supra note 68, at 50.

EAST CURRENCY REVIEW

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss1/4

26

Kwaw: The Evolving Law On The Eurobank-Customer Relationship And The Co

2004]

The Law on the Eurobank Relationship

113

saw it to be. Bankers Trust Co. appealed the decision on the grounds that
it should have been given unconditional leave to defend. In view of some
important observations made by the Court of Appeal it is instructive to
consider the decision of that court. 71
Justice Kerr in giving the opinion of the Court of Appeal stated that
the issues to be decided were as follows: (1) whether the London account
was a eurodollar account and if so (2) what the obligations of the parties
were with respect to that account. In particular, the court was concerned
with determining ( 1) if the alleged practice that eurodollar transactions
were cleared in the United States and made available there, amounted to a
legally recognized usage and if not (2) whether Libya Arab Foreign Bank
could demand payment in the manner it had requested. The other issue to
be determined was (3) the proper law governing the London account.
The court stated that Bankers Trust Co. could only rely on the
presidential orders as a defence if either U.S. law was the law governing
the contractual relationship with regards to the London account or
compliance with the demand for repayment required some act in New
York which would be illegal there.
As the Court of Appeal saw it, the facts of the case revealed strong
arguable issues that could only be decided at an ordinary trial. As Kerr L.J.
observed, what Evans J. did in awarding summary judgement was conduct
a "trial by affidavit" alone. 72 For example, on the issue of whether the
London account was a eurodollar account and if so what the obligations of
the parties were, the Court of Appeal held that Mr Justice Evans had based
his decision on the premise that a bank account is located solely at the
branch where it is kept. These made Evans J. conclude that Libya Arab
Foreign Bank could only make a demand for payment and in particular,
payment in cash at that branch. 73 For Kerr L.J., however, the rule that a
bank account is payable at the branch, probably only applied to bank
accounts denominated in local currency, and not large amounts of foreign
currency. 74 Kerr L.J., therefore, considered the possibility that the
common law place of repayment rule, while being applicable to accounts
denominated in the currency of the jurisdiction where the bank is located,
was inapplicable to foreign currency deposits.
Mustill L.J. also observed that it was very possible that the
eurocurrency market had developed special customs and practices which

71. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, reprinted in 10
[hereinafter Court ofAppeal Decision].
72. Court ofAppeal Decision, supra note 71, at 40.
73. Id. at 38.
74. Id.
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made eurocurrency accounts different from ordinary accounts and which
the court had to recognize. However, since this could only be decided after
a full trial, the defendant, Bankers Trust Co., was allowed to appeal and
given unconditional leave to defend the case. On remand the case came
before Justice Staughton of the commercial court.
The argument advanced by Libya Arab Foreign Bank on remand
varied only slightly from that advanced earlier. The most important of
these claims, which is also the focus of this section, was the first claim for
$131 million in the account in London. At the basis of this claim was the
general issue of the nature of the London account-whether it could be
called a eurodollar account-and rights and obligations of the parties with
respect to that account.
This first claim of Libya Arab Foreign Bank for the $131 million in
the London account was based on four basic propositions of the common
law approach to the ordinary banker-customer relationship. These
propositions are as follows: (1) the relationship between the banker and
customer is that of debtor and creditor; (2) the bank is liable to pay the
money owed the customer, on demand; (3) the customer is entitled to
demand to be paid in legal tender; and (4) the customer has to make the
demand at the branch where the account is kept. When these propositions
were applied to the obligations of the parties with respect to the case at
bar, it meant that (1) Bankers Trust Co. was the debtor of Libya Arab
Foreign Bank; (2) Bankers Trust Co. had to pay the money it owed Libya
Arab Foreign Bank on demand, a valid demand had been made by telex;
(3) Libya Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to be paid in legal tender, hence
the demand by telex to be paid in cash was valid; and (4) Libya Arab
Foreign Bank had to make demand at the branch where the account was
kept, which was London. Libya Arab Foreign Bank consequently argued
that there was only one contract and it was governed by English law.
Alternatively, there were two contracts with two proper laws. The contract
with respect to the New York account was governed by New York law
and the contract with respect to the London account remained governed by
English law. 75
The defendants, Bankers Trust Co., argued that the London account
was a eurodollar account and was therefore subject to rules that were
different from those applied in the ordinary banker-customer relationship.
It also argued that after 1980, with the creation of the new account, the
nature of the relationship changed: a new contract was created. After 1980,
although there were two accounts in existence-the New York and
75. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 270 (Q.B.
1987).
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London accounts-there was only one contract, and it was governed by
U.S. law. This was because it had expressly been agreed between Bankers
Trust Co. and Libya Arab Foreign Bank that all transactions would pass
through New York. Since Libya Arab Foreign Bank had expressly agreed
to the management of its accounts from New York, it was neither entitled
to make a demand for payment in London, nor receive payment there. The
corollary of this argument was that even if there had been no freeze order,
it would still have been contrary to the terms of the contract for Libya
Arab Foreign Bank to demand payment in London. Since the freeze order
had made it illegal to effect payments in New York, payment, under any
circumstances, could not be made.
This argument in defense, therefore, focused not so much on the
legality, or otherwise, of the extraterritorial application of the freeze order,
but on the nature of the contractual obligation itself, which it was argued,
was expressly governed by U.S. law.
Bankers Trust Co. also argued that apart from the express term of the
contract, there was also an implied term that the transfer of funds from
London to New York would be made by way of a U.S. clearing system, to
the credit of an account with a bank in the U.S. Such a bank or branch of a
bank would be nominated by Libya Arab Foreign Bank. In other words,
because of the nature of the usage of the eurodollar market and the course
of dealing between the parties there was an implied term that in effecting
transfers from London to New York only CHIPS or Fedwire would be
employed. 76
In arriving at a decision, Justice Staughton first considered the issue
concerning the conflict of laws. Both Bankers Trust Co. and Libya Arab
Foreign Bank did not dispute the general rule that had to be applied.
According to the principles governing the choice of law in contracts with
foreign elements, performance of a contract is excused if ( 1) it has become
illegal by the proper law of the contract or (2) it necessarily involves doing
an act that is illegal in the place of performance. 77 The court, as a threshold
issue, then had to determine the proper law that governed the London
contract after 1980.

3.

The Problem of the Proper Law

As discussed above, the place where the account is kept is also the
place of repayment under the common law. This approach is based on the
notion that money on deposit is specie and has a particular location or
76. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 277.
77. DICEY AND MORRIS: THE CONFLICT OF LA ws 1167 (Lawrence Collins ed., 11th ed.,
Stevens & Sons, London 1987).
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situs. In the common law, the proper law of the traditional banker
customer deposit contract is said to be the law of the place where the
account is kept. This rule is based on the link between the place where the
account is kept and the place of repayment in the traditional domestic
context. However, when this rule is applied to the Eurocurrency context
problems arise. This is because the place where the eurocurrecy deposit
account is kept is not the usual place of repayment.
In Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust, the Court was of the
opinion that this traditional rule was applicable to the eurocurrency
context. Mr. Justice Staughton held that one had to start from the first
principle that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the contract
between banker and customer is governed by the law of the place where
the account is kept. Therefore, the problem was to determine the place
where the London account was kept. Although he observed that it was
difficult to apply the analogy of an account being kept at a specific place
to the case at bar, 78 he nevertheless went on to conclude that since the
actual entries on the London account were made in London, the London
account was kept in London at all material times. Thus, there were either
two separate contracts or one contract with two proper laws. Mr. Justice
Staughton however, preferred the idea of one contract governed in part by
the law of New York and the law of England. 79 But as far as the
obligations of the parties concerning the London account were concerned,
Mr. Justice Staughton held that English law governed. 80
Unlike the observation of Kerr L.J. in the Court of Appeal, Mr.
Justice Staughton held that it would require overwhelming evidence
before it could be asserted that the general principles, with respect to the
choice of law rules in the banker-customer relationship, did not apply to
the eurocurrency deposit relationship. For Mr. Justice Staughton then, the
link between the place where the account is kept and the place of
repayment (which is at the basis of the proper law rule) was applicable to
the eurocurrency deposit in the case at bar. In other words, the place where
the account was kept in the eurocurrency deposit operation, London, was
the same as the place where repayment of the deposit was to take place.
4.

The Form ofPayment

Another issue that arose in the case was the form of payment. As
explained earlier, since the common law considers money on deposit to be
specie, unless an agreement to the contrary exists, the depositor is entitled
78. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 270.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 271.
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to be repaid in specie. This is problematic in the eurobanking context,
because the bank where the account is kept does not have access to specie,
and the account is in the form of book entries only. The court in Libyan
Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers' Trust, went on to consider the kind of
payment that Libyan Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to demand, which
would not necessarily involve an illegal act in the U.S.
The primary line of defence of Bankers Trust Co. was that there was
an express term in the contract after 1980 that mandated that payment be
effected via New York. If there were such an express term, Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank would not be entitled to demand payment in London and
payment would have to pass through New York. In this event, payment
would also be illegal. However, Mr. Justice Staughton held that the
managed account arrangement, together with its express term, had been
terminated by the telex sent by Libya Arab Foreign Bank demanding
payment. After this termination, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank was within its
rights to demand payment in London. Having resolved the issue of
whether there was an express term concerning payment in New York, it
was then necessary to determine if there was an implied term as advanced
by Bankers Trust Co. The essence of Bankers Trust Co.'s defense based
on the implied term, was that payment of eurodollars necessarily involved
a clearing system in the U.S. This procedure-according to Bankers Trust
Co.-was an integral part of the operation of eurocurrency deposits and
was based on the fact that the dollars, which were the subject matter of the
contract, were not available in England. Consequently, it would be
impossible to effect payment in legal tender in London. Unlike a sterling
deposit and deposits of small quantities of foreign currency, Bankers Trust
Co. had no direct access to wholesale deposits of eurodollars, which were
nothing more than book entries. This also meant that the parties could not
have envisaged cash as a means of payment. In support of this position,
Bankers Trust Co. submitted in evidence the written expert report of Dr.
Marcia Stigum. The report of Dr. Marcia Stigum stated, among other
things, that cash transactions are an insignificant part of the eurocurrency
market and that the market is strictly a non-cash market. 81 Mr. Justice
Staughton, after considering the evidence, observed that Bankers Trust Co.
had failed to establish the existence of a usage in the market as well as a
course of dealing between Libyan Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers Trust
Co., which would justify implying a term that payment had to be made in
New York, via the New York payments and clearing system. He
nevertheless made it clear that it was possible that such a usage could be
81. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 278 (quoting the
expert report of Dr Marcia Stigwn).
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established as regards time deposits that were traded between the dealing
rooms of banks. This was not so with the case at bar.
Having rejected the existence of such a usage, the Court held that
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to payment in legal tender or cash
(either dollars or sterling). 82 It was the opinion of Mr. Justice Staughton
that apart from the problem of security and counting, there was no
formidable difficulty in Bankers Trust Co. obtaining the equivalent of
$131 million in sterling notes from the Bank of England. Bankers Trust
Co. obtaining dollar bills would also pose no problems, and, in the view of
the Court, the delivery of dollars from New York would not constitute
performance per se, but merely preparation for performance. 83
Thus, in this major decision by a court, involving the deposit side of
the eurocurrency market, the common law rules regarding the bankercustomer relationship were considered applicable to eurocurrency deposits
without any modification or reformulation.
The decision leaves many unanswered questions. The Court argued
that there was no implied or express term in the deposit agreement, that
required payment to be effected in New York. In particular, the Court did
not consider the method and place of repaying large dollar deposits that
would constitute a usage. This implied that repayment of the eurocurrency
deposit in the case at bar had to take place in London, although the bank
did not have access to such large amounts of foreign currency. Indeed, the
Court did not consider it relevant to give any consideration to the nature of
the clearing system. The conclusion that may be derived from this case is
that since, according to common law principles, a depositor of local
currency has a right to demand repayment in cash a customer depositing
foreign currency also has a right to be repaid in cash (irrespective of the
quantity involved) in addition to other forms of payment. 84

82. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 281.
83. Anne Joyce, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust: Common Law Meets Its
Limits?, 29 HARV. lNT'LL.J. 451, 461 (1988).
84. See Ross Cranston, The Libyan Assets Case: Limits to Extraterritorial Claims, 3 J.
INT'L BANKING L. 177, 180 ( 1987) (in discussing other forms of repayment, Staughton drew a
distinction between the correspondent transfer and the complex dollar account transfer. He
argued that in a complex dollar transfer, a transfer in London would be reflected in the
transformation of accounts held at the Federal Reserve or a correspondent account. Although
this form of transfer involved an act in the U.S., it did not mean that payment was effected
there). See also Hal Scott, Where Are the Dollars? - Offshore Funds Transfers, 3 BANKING
& FIN. L. REV. 243-46 (1988-1989) (also agrees that payment of eurodollar deposits do not
necessarily take place in the United States, but his reasons for this assertion are different.
According to Professor Scott it is possible for payment of a eurodollar deposit to be effected by
'in-house' and correspondent bank transfers so that the payment system of the U.S. will not be
involved).
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Justice Staughton' s observations reveal that the traditional proper law
rule concerning deposit contracts may not be directly applicable to
eurocurrency deposits. The observation that in some cases it may be
possible to establish the existence of a usage concerning the repayment of
eurocurrencies via the country of issue, suggests that the traditional
approach may be modified. This is because since the proper law rule is
based on the common law link between the place where the account is
kept and the place of repayment, in those situations where the place of
repayment is different from the place where the account entries are made,
the basis for the rule collapses.
It is submitted, on the basis of the above analysis, that there is the
need for a re-evaluation of the common law regarding the payment
obligation of banks. The common law must take into consideration the
modem reality. In this day and age of eurocurrency deposits and
placement operations where an account is opened without the deposit or
transfer of actual specie, the prevailing practice suggests the existence of
an implied term that payment is made not where the account is maintained
but in the country of issue of the currency concerned. Regretfully, the
court in Libyan Arab Foreign, Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. 85 missed a good
opportunity to rethink the archaic common law approach to the banker
customer relationship. For the court to say that in the absence of a
statement to the contrary, a depositor of foreign currency of whatever
amount has a right to demand payment in cash, because "every monetary
obligation is to be fulfilled by the delivery of cash," is not in accordance
with the reality. 86

5.
The Funds Transfer RelationshipBbetween Eurobank and
Customer
The second stage in the relationship between the eurobank and the
customer arises when the customer gives the eurobank a mandate to effect
a transfer of funds. In the search for legal rules to govern funds transfers,
courts in the past have relied on analogies from the common law rules
regarding the collection and payment of cheques and other bills of
exchange. One of these analogies concerns the law of agency as it applies
to the collection and payment of bills of exchange.
In the ordinary common law banker customer relationship, it is
generally accepted, that although the general character of the bankercustomer relationship is that of a contract, this legal character is modified

85. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 259.
86. Id. at 281.

Published by SURFACE, 2004

33

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 1 [2004], Art. 4

120

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 32:87

and becomes one of agenc~ when the bank undertakes certain transactions
on behalf of its customer. 7 When the bank obtains a mandate from the
customer to effect a transfer of funds from one ordinary account to
another, the contractual relationship is modified and becomes one of
agency. The reason is that in both credit and debit transfers, 88 as in the
case of collecting negotiable instruments and effecting payment via the
cheque clearing process, the bank is acting in a representative capacity on
the instructions of its customer. 89 The customer is the principal in this
agency relationship and the bank transferring the funds, the transmitting or
originating bank, is the agent.
While it is generally accepted that the above common law principles
also apply in the eurobaking context, courts have drawn a distinction
between on the one hand, the process of transferring funds, which gives
rise to a relationship of agency, and on the other, the instruction to transfer
funds from the customer which does not give rise to any legal relationship.
This distinction was drawn in Royal Products v. Midland Bank. 90
In Royal Products, the Plaintiff, was a company that carried out its
operations in Malta, and maintained bank accounts with Midland Bank in
England, and National Bank and Bank of Industry Commerce and
Agriculture (BICAL) both located in Malta. In November 1972, Royal
Products wanted to transfer funds from its account with Midland Bank in
England to National Bank in Malta. If the transfer was affected directly,
Royal Products would have had to pay certain high fees. Royal Products
thus, decided not to transfer the funds to National Bank, but rather to
transfer the funds to BICAL and it instructed Midland Bank to transfer the

87. See London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan and Arthur, [1918] A.C. 777; Austrlia
& New Zealand Bank Ltd. v. Ateliers De Constructions Electriques De Charleroi, [1967] 1
A.C. 86; Hapgood, supra note 44, at 407-35; Ogilvie, supra note 43, at 557.
88. A credit transfer is an order or instruction from the customer to its bank to transfer
funds from the customer's account to the account of the payee, maintained either with the same
bank or another bank. A credit transfer therefore, has the effect of pushing funds from the
account of the payor-customer sending the payment order, to the beneficiary. A debit transfer,
on the other hand, seeks to draw funds from one account into another account. Examples of
debit transfers include ( 1) a direct debiting arrangement where the payee's bank is instructed by
the payee-customer to obtain payments due to the payee from the payor's bank and (2) the use
ofa check.
89. See Richard King, The Receiving Bank's Role in Credit Transfer Transactions, 45
Moo. L. REV. 369 (1982); D.I. BAKER & R.E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFERS chs. 29-11 (Warren, Gorham, and Lamont, 2nd ed. 1988); LORD CHORLEY & J.
MILNES HOLDEN, LAW OF BANKING 266 (Sweet & Maxwell 1974); E.P. Ellinger, The Giro
System and Electronic Funds Transfers, 2 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 178, 195 (1986)
(arguing that funds transfers are composed of a string of transactions in which the banks
involved act in representative capacities).
90. See Royal Products v. Midland Bank, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194 (Q.B. 1980).
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funds to BICAL. Midland Bank, which had a correspondent relationship
with National Bank in Malta, had on previous occasions arranged such a
transfer directly with BICAL. However, on this occasion Midland Bank
decided to affect the transfer through its correspondent relationship with
National Bank. Midland thus instructed National Bank to transfer the
requested funds from its vostro account to the account of Royal Products
at BICAL. This instruction was given by telex. National Bank only
became aware of the telex the following day, November 24. On that day,
instead of immediately affecting the transfer, National Bank opened an
internal suspense account in the name ofBICAL and credited this account.
The funds were transferred later. The following day BICAL ceased
operations and the Central Bank of Malta took over its operations.
On November 27, upon determining that BICAL had ceased
operating, Royal Products asked Midland Bank to amend the funds
transfer instruction and not to transfer funds to BICAL but to National
Bank. Following these instructions, Midland Bank instructed National
Bank to retrieve the original remittance. National Bank advised Midland
Bank that the transfer had already been affected on November 25 and that
it could not be retrieved because BICAL was now under the control of the
Central Bank of Malta, which had imposed restrictions on BICAL's
operations. Midland Bank informed Royal Products of the situation and
Royal Products commenced an action in England against Midland Bank.
Royal Products argued that: ( 1) they were entitled to be reimbursed
their money because their instructions were never carried out; (2) Midland
Bank owed it a duty in carrying out the funds transfer instructions and
were in breach of this duty; and (3) National Bank, the third party, and
Royal Products had a contractual relationship, and National Bank should
have effected the transfer on the date that it received the order.
In determining whether Royal Products could recover its funds, the
Court made certain statements respecting the legal character of the funds
transfer order and the nature of the legal relationship that arises when a
funds transfer order is given. According to the Court, a funds transfer
order is nothing more than a mere instruction from the customer to the
bank to affect a transfer. While the process of affecting the transfer could
give rise to a legal relationship, such as an agency relationship, the transfer
order itself did not give rise to any relationship between Royal Products
and Midland Bank.
The Court held further, that Midland owed a duty to use care in
carrying out the transfer and could be held to be vicariously liable for the
conduct of its agents. However, the funds transfer instruction did not
create any additional obligation on Midland Bank. The instruction merely
required that Midland Bank affect a transfer, it did not preclude it from
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employing a specific method of transfer. Finally, the court also held that
there was nothing in the instructions to affect the transfer that created
privity of contract between Royal Products and the subagent, National
Bank.
The decision exposes an inconsistency between, the traditional
common law approach as laid down by Atkin L.J. in Joachimson v. Swiss
Bank, including the relationship between a bank and its customer in the
domestic context, versus, the relationship in the eurobanking context. In
the domestic context banks are frequently required by clients to undertake
certain activities, including crediting the account of other customers at the
same bank or at other banks. The decision in Joachimson v. Swiss Bank
makes it clear that the relationship between a bank and its customer is
contractual. As part of the contract there is an obligation on the customer
to "exercise reasonable care in executing written orders so as not to
mislead the bank." The reason for this is that the written order or
instruction binds the bank and it must act on the written order. The
decision in Royal Products suggests, however, that when the customer
gives a bank an instruction, for example, to credit the account of another
customer, that instruction does not give rise to any legal relationship
between the bank and the customer. In the eurobanking context then, a
distinction is drawn between the funds transfer instruction, and the process
of effecting the transfer. If there is any legal relationship, it arises only at
the time that the eurobank proceeds to effect the transfer and not before.
Conceptually, it is difficult to see how one is able to sever the
instruction of the customer from the totality of the contractual relationship
that underpins the banker customer relationship, so that one is able to
make the argument that the instruction of a customer to its bank, gives rise
to no legal relationship. The decision clearly creates a need for clarity in
the common law on the banker customer relationship.
i. Duties of the Originating Bank as an Agent

The relationship of agency in the credit transfer process imposes
certain duties on the transmitting/originating bank. One of the most
important duties that the transmitting bank owes to the customer is a duty
to exercise care and skill in the process of transferring the funds. It is
generally accepted that the standard that is imposed on the transmitting
bank is the standard which is expected of a bank engaged in that business,
according to current banking standards. This duty of care and skill may be
divided into three facets: ( 1) the transferring bank must act in accordance
with the mandate of its customer; (2) the transferring bank is obliged to
employ the services of a reliable correspondent bank to effect the transfer
where this is needed; and (3) the transferring bank must effect a timely
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss1/4
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transfer of the funds concemed. 91 This duty of care and skill is owed only
to the sending customer and not to a stranger, or the payee. 92 The only
time where an originating or paying bank will owe a duty to a payee is
where the paying bank is also a receiving bank. In this context, the bank
owes a duty in its capacity as a receiving bank. However, the case of
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. 93 suggests that a paying or
originating bank may owe a duty to a payee not only because it is also a
receiving bank, but also because it assumed or took upon itself the
responsibility of effecting the transfer on behalf of the payee. The case
stands for the proposition that if a party assumes the responsibility of
performing a task on behalf of another, then that party is liable in the event
that its act or omissions result in damage to the other party.

6.

The Duty to Act in Accordance with the Customer's Mandate

Under the law of agency, an agent is required to comply strictly with
the instructions of its principal. This has been determined to mean that
where the agent exceeds its authority or does not follow the mandate of its
principal to the letter, the agent will not receive any reimbursement. 94 This
is so even if the result of exceeding or going contrary to the principal' s
instructions is not detrimental to the principal. The corollary of this rule is
that the principal' s instructions, in this case the customer's instructions to
the transferring bank, have to be unambiguous and clear. It has been held
in some cases that where the mandate of the principal is ambiguous, the
agent may use the ambiguity to justify its construction of the
instructions. 95
In the context of funds transfers, the originating or transmitting bank
is under a duty to act in accordance with the customer's mandate. Failing
to act in accordance with the customer's mandate is the general expression
that encompasses a variety of situations in which the transferring bank

91. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson, 27 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 49 (H.L. 1926) (In the
absence of a contractual disclaimer, the originating bank is held to be vicariously liable for the
negligence or default of its correspondents).
92. This is especially relevant in those situations where the originating bank accepts a
transfer order from a stranger, pursuant to an arrangement between the beneficiary bank and the
originating bank that is intended to benefit the beneficiary or payee. The possibility of a stranger
using a bank to affect a credit transfer to a payee at another bank is very likely in England
where, after the Golden Memorandum of 1967, a person is able to effect payments into the
account of another from any bank in the U .K. under the Giro system.
93. Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 761 (1994); see also White v.
Jones, 2 W.L.R. 187 (1995).
94. See Midland Bank v. Seymour, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 147, 168 (Q.B. 1955).
95. See Ireland v. Livingston, [1872] 5 L.R. 395 (H.L.); see also European Asian Bank
v. Punjab & Sind Bank, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 611, 617 (1983).
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effects an incorrect transfer. This includes effecting a transfer to the wrong
payee or beneficiary, including the situation where no transfer is
authorized, and effecting a transfer to the correct payee, but in the wrong
amount.
The current position seems to be that the rule regarding strict
compliance by an agent with the instructions of its principal is modified in
the funds transfer context. In Royal Products v. Midland Bank, 96 it was
held that a transferring bank will not be held to be in breach of its mandate
if, in following the instructions, it acts in accordance with the skill and
manner generally accepted in the business of banking. 97

i. The duty to engage a reliable correspondent bank
According to the law of agency, an agent may neither delegate its
authority nor appoint a sub-agent to undertake any transaction on behalf of
the principal, without the express or implied authority of the principal. 98
Then, prima facie, the transmitting (originating) bank, without the
authority of the customer, may not engage any other bank to assist it in
effecting the transfer. This general rule poses problems in those situations
where the beneficiary-payee of a funds transfer order maintains an account
at another bank with which the transmitting (originating) bank does not
have a correspondent account. Where a beneficiary-payee of a funds
transfer order maintains an account at either ( 1) a bank with which the
transmitting (originating) bank has a correspondent relationship, or (2)
another branch of the transmitting (originating) bank, then a direct transfer
is possible. However, in those situations where neither of the above
account arrangements exists, there is the need for an intermediary bank.
The position seems to be that where there is the need to employ the
services of a correspondent sub-agent, the transmitting (originating) bank
will be deemed to have the implied authority of it's customer-principal to
appoint the correspondent bank as its sub-agent for the purposes of
affecting the transfer. 99 This is so for two reasons. First, the nature of the
transaction is such that it cannot be carried out without the appointment of
a sub-agent. This being so, it is possible to argue that the customerprincipal intended that the transmitting (originating) bank should be able
to delegate its authority. 100 Also, the employment of a sub-agent to assist

96. See Royal Products v. Midland Bank, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194 (Q.B. 1980).
97. Id. at 194, 199.
98. De Bussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. D. 286 (1878).
99. Quebec & Richmond Railway v. Quinn, 14 E.L.R. 899 (1858); see also Equitable
Trust Co. ofNew York v. Dawson Partners Ltd., 25 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 90 (1926).
100. De Bussche, 8 Ch. D. 286 (1878).
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the transmitting (originating) bank in effecting the transfer of funds is
justified by the customs and usage of the eurocurrency market.
IV. THE RELATION SHIP BETWEEN THE TRANSMITTING ORIGIN ATING BANK
AND THE CORRESPONDENT BANK

Since the correspondent bank acts on the instructions of the
transmitting (originating) bank, it is the agent of that bank. The rules
discussed above, regarding the duties of skill and care of an agent, are also
applicable here. The correspondent bank is under a duty to act in
accordance with the mandate that is given to it by its principal, the
transmitting (originating) bank, and to use such skill and care as would be
expected of a comparable bank in such a situation.

A.

The Relationship Between the Payor/Sending Customer and the
Correspondent Bank

Regarding the relationship between the customer who initiates the
funds transfer, and the intermediary correspondent bank, the general rule
is that delegation does not create privity of contract between the principal
and the sub-agent. Thus, so far as the issue of rights and liabilities is
concerned, the payor (the principal) may only sue and be sued by the
transferring-originating bank (the agent). Likewise, the sub-agent, the
correspondent bank, may only sue and be sued by the agent-transmitting
(originating) bank. 101
This situation, where the transmitting (originating) bank delegates its
authority to another intermediary bank because the nature of the
transaction warrants it, needs to be differentiated from those situations
where ( 1) a customer may employ a bank specifically for the purposes of
creating an agency relationship between it and a third party, and (2) the
agent undertakes to provide the customer with another agent as a substitute
for itself. In these two situations, the customer's bank, in reality becomes
functus officio when the third party is appointed an agent. In general then,
whether privity of contract exists between the customer who initiates the
funds transfer and the intermediary bank which is employed by the
customer's bank to effect the transfer, will depend on the circumstances of
the case and the intention of the customer (the principal). There are two
U.S. cases which illustrate this exception to the general rule regarding
privity, namely, Silverstein v. Chartered Bank, 102 and Evra Corp. v. Swiss

101. Calico Printers Asso 'n v. Barclays Bank, 145 L.T. 51 (1931); Schmaling v. Tonlinson,
6 Taunt 147 (1815).
102. Silverstein v. Chartered Bank H.K., 392 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1977).
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Bank. 103
In Silverstein, the U.S. court was of the opinion that there was privity
of contract between the payor-customer and the bank's correspondent
because the correspondent had been expressly requested by the customer.
Evra Corp., involved an Illinois corporation, Evra Corp., that was
engaged in shipping and the purchase and sale scrap metal. Evra Corp.
entered into a charter under which it was required to pay approximately
$1,825 per day as rent. The ship was to be used by Evra Corp. to deliver
scrap metal to fulfil a prior contract with a Brazilian corporation. The
charter provided that if Evra Corp. failed to make payment on time, the
owner could withdraw the vessel. Payment was to be made by wire
transfer through an Illinois bank, the Continental Illinois National Bank.
Continental, to the Swiss account of the owners at Banque de Paris et des
Pays-Bas (Suisse). To affect this transfer, Continental Illinois National
Bank used Swiss Bank as its correspondent bank. For one payment,
following a request from Evra Corp., Continental Illinois Bank sent a
funds transfer order to its London branch for transmittal to Swiss Bank in
Geneva. A telex operator at the London branch of Continental Illinois
National Bank tried to reach Swiss Bank's general telex to provide it with
the funds transfer instructions but did not succeed. The telex operator then
sent another message to another telex number at Swiss Bank and received
a confirmation that the message had been received. Unbeknownst to the
telex operator, there was no paper in the telex machine to which the
message had been sent, although the machine continued to receive
messages. Consequently, Swiss Bank did not act on the funds transfer
message and the funds were not paid into the account of the ship owners at
the required time. The owners withdrew the Charter and Evra Corp. sued
Swiss Bank alleging that Swiss Bank had breached its contract with it.
Swiss Bank in defence argued that it owed no duty to Evra Corp. as it was
a merely a correspondent bank and an agent of Continental Illinois
National Bank. The Court held that Swiss Bank was liable to pay damages
for breach of contract and negligence and that there was privity of contract
between Evra Corp. and Swiss Bank. Although the decision was
overturned, the decision on appeal turned on the issue of consequential
damages. The dictum of the lower court with respect to privity between
Evra Corp. and Swiss Bank was not discussed on appeal.
Thus, if the circumstances of a case suggest that the customer's bank
was authorized to find a bank that would affect a transfer, as opposed to
effecting the transfer itself with the aid of an intermediary bank, there will

103. Evra C01p. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820 (1981); rev'd 673 F.2d 951 (1982).
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be privity of contract between the customer and the intermediary bank
which is employed by the customer's bank. However, if the customer
initiating the funds transfer authorized the bank to affect a transfer, and the
bank employed the services of a correspondent bank to do so, the
exception to the rule regarding privity will not apply. However, since most
eurocurrency transactions are effected by the means of correspondent
banks that are employed by other banks to effect transfers, the general
common law rule, which leans against finding privity of contract, will
apply.
It is possible to argue that the above cases have not really altered the
general rule with regard to privity of contract because they were decided
on peculiar facts. For instance, it is possible to argue that in Silverstein, by
expressly requesting a correspondent bank, the customer had impliedly
requested its bank to create an agency relationship between it and the
correspondent bank. In other words, by expressly selecting the
correspondent bank, the transferor had taken away from its bank one of
the attributes that would have made it a principal: the ability to choose and
employ an agent.
Although the decision in Evra Corp. is more difficult to justify, it is
possible to argue that the U.S. District Court found privity of contract
because of its reliance on Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
Court held that under the common law of the U.S., there was privity of
contract between a principal and its sub-agent.
It is possible to argue on the basis of the current state of the law, that
as a general rule, the correspondent will not be held liable for breach of
contract vis-a-vis the initiating customer if it is shown that: (1) the
transferring bank was authorized to effect the transfer and not to create an
agency relationship between the correspondent bank and its customer; (2)
the transferring bank engaged the correspondent bank, on its own initiative
to assist it in effecting the transfer; and (3) the transferring bank has not
undertaken to provide the customer with another agent as a substitute to
itself.

B.

Can the Correspondent Bank be Liable in Tort?

Although it is generally accepted that the transferring bank will be
held liable for the negligence or default of its agent, the liability of the
correspondent bank in tort to the initiating customer is not at all certain. It
has been argued, on the basis of an analogy with the law of bailment, that
a correspondent bank can be held liable in tort to the customer of a
transferring bank.
According to this approach, in the law of bailment, if "X" bails goods
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to "Y," who then makes a bailment of the goods to "Z," "Z" will be held
liable for the loss or destruction of the goods. 104 However, it is not at all
clear if this principle in the law of bailment can be applied to the law of
agency. In Balgamo v. Medeci, an attempt to apply the approach to the law
of agency failed. 105 Justice Walton, in addition to holding that the principal
could not sue the sub-agent in contract because there was no privity, also
held that because there was no duty owed by the sub-agent to the
principal, no action could be maintained in tort. Consequently, the only
right of action was in contract against the agent. This case may not be as
decisive a determinant of the issue as it seems for various reasons. First,
the reason why the principal could not sue the sub-agent in tort appears to
have been procedural. The sub-agent was not named and served as a third
party. Also it seems too broad a statement to state that no duty of care
arises between the correspondent bank, which is a sub-agent, and the
customer who initiates the transfer. The argument may be made that the
customer is a person who the correspondent bank should foresee as likely
to be affected by its acts and omissions if it does not exercise due care.
Thus, a duty of care arises in this sense.
It has also been argued that correspondent bank is too remote a
potential tortfeasor to be sued in tort. However, this argument is without
any foundation in law. The issue of proximity in tort law is with regard to
the injured party and not the tortfeasor. It is definitely certain, that a
customer is a party who is reasonably foreseeable by the correspondent
bank. Consequently, an action in negligence may be brought against it.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RECEIVING/DESTINATION BANK AND
THE BENEFICIARY-CUSTOMER

The existing case law suggests that when a receiving/beneficiary
bank receives funds on behalf of its customer, the payee or beneficiary, it
does so as an agent of such a customer. In The Laconia, Denning M.R.
states, "[T]he paying bank is the agent of its own customer to make the
payment, [and] the receiving bank is an agent of its customer to receive
it." 106 However, although the argument that an agency relationship
existing between the sending-customer and the transferring bank can be
justified on the basis of the principles of the common law, it is difficult to

104. See Lee Cooper Ltd. v. CH Jenkins & Sons Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 753 (Q.B. 1965); Learoyd
Bros. & Co. v. Pope & Sons Ltd., [1968] 1 All E.R. 811; James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Hay's
Transport Services Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 535 (Q.B. 1972).
105. Balsamo v. Medici, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 951 (Ch. D. 1984).
106. Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd., v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia, [1976] Q.B.
835 (C.A. 1986) [hereinafter The Laconia].
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justify the agency argument when it comes to the relationship between the
receiving/destination bank and the payee or beneficiary.
There are various reasons for this. First, the agency argument goes
against the very basis of the law regarding the banker-customer deposit
relationship. Cases such as Foley v. Hill and Joachimson v. Swiss Bank
Corp. have laid down the often quoted principle that when a depositor
places money in a bank account, the money so deposited constitutes a loan
to the bank. 107 The bank becomes the borrower and as such it can use the
funds as it sees fit. The relationship is not one of bailment. If this is the
basis of the banker-customer deposit relationship, then when a bank
receives money on behalf of its customer, it does not do so as an agent for
its customer, but in its own right as a borrower.
As well, when a bank transfers funds into a nominated bank account,
the transfer discharges any debt that the payor owed to the payee. The
receiving bank then becomes the new debtor or takes the place of the
original payor in respect of the sum that is owed to the payee. To argue
then that the receiving bank is an agent of the payee, is to say that contrary
to the basic principles of the banker-customer relationship, the payee and
not the bank owns the funds deposited.
Another reason why the argument that the receiving bank is an agent
to receive funds transferred to the payee is incorrect is that, such an
argument is incapable of explaining the point in time when the receiving
bank ceases to be an agent and becomes the owner of the funds which
have been deposited into the account of the payee.
The better approach, it is submitted, is that when the receiving bank
receives funds on behalf of its customer, unless there are circumstances
which indicate a different kind of result, such a receiving bank receives the
funds, not as an agent of the customer-payee, but in its own right as a
borrower and consequently, an owner of the funds. This argument finds
support in Midland Bank v. Conway. 108 In that case Mr. Justice Sachs held
that although a bank received rent on behalf of its customer, who was a
landlord, it did not do so as an agent for the customer. Rather, in receiving
the rent, it did so in its capacity as a banker, by virtue of the relationship of
banker and customer.

VI.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSMITTING BANKS AND FUNDS
TRANSFER NETWORKS

The above discussion shows that the interbank transfer of funds is

107. Joachimson, [1921] 3 K.B. 110, (Eng. C.A. 1921); Foley, 2 H.L. Cas. 28 (1848).
108. Midland Bank, Ltd. v. Conway Borough Council, 1 W.L.R. 1165 (Q.B. 1965).
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essentially the interbank transfer of financial information. This
information results in the alteration of information possessed by the
concerned banks. The transmission of such financial information is made
possible by the use of electronic funds transfer mechanisms, which are
employed by network organizations. It will be recalled that these network
organizations fall into two categories, namely, (1) those networks which
are concerned with the transfer of financial information alone, and (2)
those networks, which, in addition to being transferors of financial
information, are also clearing and settlement systems.
What the existence of network organizations means is that instead of
a bank sending a message directly to another bank; it sends it to the
network which then transmits it to the receiving bank. As between the
banks and the network organizations, the relationship is primarily
contractual and is concerned with the actual communication of the
financial information and messages, that is, the transfer and delivery of the
information or message. The terms of the contract, which will usually be
contained in the user handbook of the particular network organization,
will, in most cases, govern aspects of the bank-network relationship such
as, ( 1) the correct format to be used for the conveyance of the message or
financial information; (2) security for messages and the prevention of
fraud; (3) confidentiality of messages; (4) procedures to be followed to
obtain redress in the event of network failure or malfunction; and,( 5) the
extent to which the network organization guarantees the accurate
transmission of messages.
CONCLUSION

The above discussion has revealed clear differences between the
common law on the banker-customer relationship and the evolving law on
the eurobanker-customer relationship. As this article has shown, what one
can describe as the traditional common law on the banker-customer
relationship, as laid down in cases such as Joachimson v. Swiss Bank, is
based on the notion that money is cash or specie, and a deposit of money
in a bank is a deposit of cash or specie. This notion influences the common
law approach with respect to other aspects of the banker-customer
relationship. For example, the law with respect the place of repayment of a
deposit, and the law with respect to the proper law of the deposit. As this
article has shown, applying the traditional common law approach to the
relationship between a eurobank and its customer gives rise to problems
for several reasons: (1) deposits of eurocurrency are not deposits of specie
or physical cash, but book entries; (2) the transaction straddles a number
of jurisdictions; and (3) the place where the book entries representing the
deposit are made, is not necessarily the place where the deposit is repaid.
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These differences do not augur well for consistency and certainty in the
law. There is thus the need for the courts to infuse some clarity into the
law.
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